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Abstract 
 
When deciding how to weigh benefits to different groups, standard economic models 
assume that people focus on the final distribution of utility, health or whatever.  Thus, 
an egalitarian is assumed to be egalitarian in the outcome space.  But what about 
egalitarianism in the gains space, such that people focus instead on how equally 
benefits are distributed?  This paper reports on a study in which members of the 
public were asked to rank a number of health programmes that differed in the 
distribution of benefits and final outcomes in ways that enabled us to distinguish 
between different types of egalitarianism.  The results suggest that outcome 
egalitarianism dominates, particularly for differences in health by social class, but a 
sizeable minority of respondents appear to be gain egalitarians, especially when the 
health differences are by sex.  These results have important implications for how we 
think about outcome-based social welfare functions in economics. 
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1. Introduction 
 
A central criterion by which public sector resources are allocated is efficiency.  
Economists have developed methods, like cost-benefit analysis, that help determine 
an efficient use of resources.  But policy-makers – as well as members of the general 
public – are likely to be concerned about the distributional consequences of 
alternative allocation decisions as well as their efficiency.  Thus, the two main policy 
concerns are: efficiency, representing how much more welfare is produced compared 
to the status quo; and equity, representing how equal the distribution of welfare is 
across the relevant parties. 
 
The conventional frameworks relevant to efficiency judgements and that for equity 
judgements do not coincide.  More specifically, imagine, as in Figure 1, a two-
dimensional space with the welfare, or health, of two parties (two individuals, or two 
homogeneous population groups) represented along the two axes.  Efficiency is 
usually judged by how much more the intervention will produce, and therefore, given 
a specific starting point (S), by how far to the north east the end point will lie with 
respect to this point S.  However, equity is usually judged by how equal the two 
parties are in terms of their eventual levels of welfare, and so it will be judged with 
reference to how close the end point is to the 45 degree diagonal through the origin, 
O.  In other words, the frame of reference for efficiency is the “gains space” with the 
origin at the initial point S, whereas the frame of reference for equity is the “outcomes 
space” with the origin at point O, where both parties have zero welfare.     
 
In the health economics literature, the axes can represent one’s lifetime total health, 
and the initial point the amounts of health so far experienced by the individual(s).  
Then the distinction between the outcomes space and the gains space is equivalent to 
the distinction between lifetime health and prospective health (see for example Dolan 
and Olsen, 2001).  Since it is impossible to take away from somebody the health 
experience they have already had, all efficiency judgements take place in terms of 
prospective health, that is the gains space. 
 
Conventional equity in health can be represented by a concern over the final 
distribution of health in the outcomes space, across the past and the future, for 
example by looking at the distribution of expected age of death, or expected lifetime 
health across different populations.  In more general terms, the use of the gains space 
for efficiency judgements can be justified by appealing to the Pareto criterion: 
because any end point to the south or to the west of the initial point S represents a loss 
to at least one party, this will not satisfy efficiency. 
 
On the other hand, however, why is equity conceptualised in terms of outcomes, for 
example as the equality of welfare?  In other words, are there any circumstances 
under which “gain egalitarianism”, or the equality of gains, become relevant?  Unless 
the starting point S happens to lie on the 45° from the origin O, equity in the outcomes 
space and equity in the gains space will not coincide.  Equal outcomes will require 
unequal gains, and equal gains will result in unequal outcomes.  Therefore, if there are 
to be such circumstances where gain egalitarianism applied, equity in outcomes space 
needs to be seen as less relevant: i.e. not all unequal outcomes would be automatically 
regarded as inequitable.  For instance, imagine a very poor commune where some 
members are close to starving.  People may think that it is a matter of equity that 
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everybody should achieve the same subsistence-level nutrition even if this meant 
unequal rations across members, so that outcome egalitarianism applied.  But when 
imagining a much affluent commune where no member was starving, people may 
think differently.  This time, equity might require equal rations for everybody even if 
this implied unequal outcomes across members, which would be in line with gain 
egalitarianism.  This thought experiment suggests that the same people may be 
outcome egalitarian or gain egalitarian, depending on the context.  Specifically, as in 
this example, it is a reasonable conjecture that the more “basic” the distribuendum, 
the more support outcome egalitarianism will receive.  
 
In the area of health, there is some evidence that suggests members of the public think 
that whereas inequality in life expectancy at birth across the socio-economic classes is 
inequitable, a similar inequality across the sexes is not inequitable (Dolan et al., 
2002).  And if so, it may be reasonable to use the outcomes space to assess the equity 
of health policies that affect different socio-economic groups, but to use the gains 
space to assess the equity of health policies that affect the two sex groups. (For a 
theoretical discussion on the equitableness of the inequality in lifetime health between 
the sexes, see Tsuchiya and Williams, 2004). 
  
One way to deal with the dual objectives of efficiency and distributional concerns is 
to introduce inequality aversion into an outcome-based objective function, as is done 
with any standard concave social welfare function (SWF).  Here, efficiency and 
equity are collapsed into one objective function, with specific trade offs between them 
implied.  This in effect puts the gains space into the background, and offers a 
complete ordering of all possible outcomes with reference to the origin O, so that any 
move from any point that crosses a social welfare contour away from the origin O is 
an improvement.  As a result, the gains based Pareto criterion in the original sense is 
also compromised: given diminishing marginal rates of substitution, a move from 
starting point S to any point in the area marked p in Figure 1 (i.e. to the north-west 
from S and to the east of the social welfare contour through point S) will be regarded 
as an improvement although one party will be strictly worse off than at the initial 
point S.  This reflects a tension between a social welfare judgement placed explicitly 
within the gains space, and a social welfare judgement placed primarily within the 
outcomes space.     
 
On the other hand, a gain based assumption in the literature of SWF is the principle of 
monotonic increase, or the monotonicity principle, which states that social welfare 
will not decrease when the welfare of at least one party is improved.  In other words, 
starting from point S, any move due north (or due east) is associated with a superior 
social welfare contour.  However, if the location of S is considered to be sufficiently 
far away from the 45 degree diagonal through the origin O to the north west, in other 
words if the distribution under S is considered to be sufficiently unequal, then since 
the only party to be made better off would be the already much better off party, some 
may find it awkward that a move due north be regarded as an improvement.  Indeed, 
there is some evidence to suggest that a significant proportion of the general public 
may have preferences that violate the monotonicity principle.  For instance, Dolan et 
al has found that up to 20% of those interviewed had such preferences (Dolan et al., 
2002).  Such perceptions support a backward bending social welfare contour (Abasolo 
and Tsuchiya, 2004), which allows for the possibility that a move due north from 
certain points is associated with an inferior contour, because it implies moving away 
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from 45 degree diagonal through the origin O.  So this is another example of a 
conflict between a social welfare judgement placed within the gains space, and a 
social welfare judgement placed within the outcomes space.     
 
This paper uses examples from inequalities in health to explore two issues related to 
the tension between gain based social judgements and outcome based social 
judgements.  One relates to gain egalitarianism.  Our conjecture is that when an 
existing inequality is perceived to be less inequitable, more people will support gain 
egalitarianism.  The second issue is the violation of monotonicity.  Our conjecture 
here is that when an existing inequality is perceived to be more inequitable, more 
people will violate the monotonicity principle.  In order to explore these conjectures, 
we assume, in line with previous findings, that inequalities in health across social 
classes are perceived to be more inequitable than the same degree of inequalities in 
health across the sexes.  We also assume, in line with common sense, that inequalities 
in life expectancy are more inequitable than inequalities in prevalence of illness.  The 
following sections present the methods of a questionnaire based survey administered 
in small group settings, the results concerning the two issues above, and a discussion. 
 
2. Methods 
 
2.1 Questionnaire 
 
Respondents were asked five questions on priority setting in health policy.  This paper 
reports on the results of the third and fourth questions, which are referred to as 
Question 1 and Question 2 hereafter.  (For details of the other questions, see Dolan 
and Tsuchiya, 2005.)  The two questions discussed in the current paper involved 
trade-offs between health maximisation and a more equal distribution of health.  Both 
questions used a benefit trade-off (BTO) method in which the size of the health 
benefit is used as the currency to express the trade-off between efficiency and 
equality.  Question 1 used life expectancy at birth as the measure of health and 
Question 2 used the prevalence of long-term limiting illness (see Appendix A for the 
format of Question 1 – Question 2 followed a similar format). 
 
 
Question 1 presented respondents with information on life expectancy at birth, at the 
starting point, which was 73 for the disadvantaged group, I, and 78 for the advantaged 
group, J.  Both groups are of equal size.  Respondents were asked to imagine six 
scenarios that could increase average life expectancy by varying amounts for the two 
groups.  The six scenarios were presented in random order to avoid any anchoring 
effects, or ‘status quo’ bias (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1998), and respondents were 
first asked to choose their most preferred scenario.  Having done this, they chose their 
second preferred scenario, third preferred and so on – effectively, ranking all six 
scenarios in order of preference, with no ties allowed.   
 
 
The six scenarios, labelled a to f, are shown below, and the starting point (S) and the 
resulting distributions of health from each scenario are illustrated in Figure 2(a).   
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 Group I Group J 
a + 2 years + 2 years 
b + 3 years + 1 years 
c + 4 years + 0 years 
d + 3.5 years + 0 years 
e + 3 years + 0 years 
f + 2 years + 0 years 
 
Question 2 presented respondents with prevalence rates of limiting long-term illness, 
which for the disadvantaged group was 40%, and for the advantaged group was 12%.  
Again, respondents were asked to imagine six scenarios that could reduce rates of 
illness by differing amounts for both groups, and to rank the scenarios in order of 
preference from the first to the sixth.  The six scenarios are shown below and were 
designed to identify different types of preferences similar to those identified in 
Question 1, and are illustrated in Figure 2(b), where the axes are arranged so that 
reducing illness be represented in moves towards the right or above. 
 
 
 Group I Group J 
a - 7 % - 7 % 
g - 14 % - 0 % 
c - 12 % - 2 % 
d - 11 % - 2 % 
e - 10 % - 2 % 
f - 7 % - 2 % 
 
In order to test whether people’s aversion to inequality differs according to the groups 
across which the inequalities exist, half the respondents received a variant where the 
health differences were by the highest and lowest social classes, and the half received 
another variant where the same differences existed between women and men.  In 
Question 1, men are the disadvantaged group, and in Question 2 it is women, 
reflecting the shorter life expectancy of men and the higher level of morbidity 
amongst women. 
 
2.2 Analysis 
 
The results are summarised by the distribution of ranks and the average ranks given to 
each scenario by question and by questionnaire variant.  Given the study design, 
individual level results will be summarised in three ways: 
 
1. The ordering for scenarios a, b, c, and g, along the ΔHI + ΔHJ = C line.  If a 
respondent is averse to inequalities in consequences, then c[4,0] f b[3,1] f a[2,2] for 
Q3 and g[-14,0] f c[-12,-2] f a[-7,-7] for Q4 should hold.  In what follows, we will 
refer to this ordering as the “concave ordering”.  On the other hand, if a respondent is 
gain egalitarian, then their rank ordering will be determined by how close the points 
are to the line ΔHI = ΔHJ, so the reverse preference ordering a f b f c for Q3 and a f 
c f g for Q4 should hold.  These will be referred to as the “reverse concave ordering”. 
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2. The ordering for scenarios c, d, e, and f, along the straight horizontal line.  If a 
respondent’s preference is either increasing in total health or decreasing in outcome 
inequality, then c[4,0] f d[3.5,0] f e[3,0] f f[2,0] for Q3 and c[-12,-2] f d[-11,-2] f 
e[-10,-2] f f[-7,-2] for Q4 should hold.  We refer to this ordering as the “dominant 
ordering”.  On the other hand, if a respondent is gain egalitarian, then the reverse 
ordering f f e f d f c should hold.  This will be referred to as the “reverse dominant 
ordering”.     
 
3. Where the dominant ordering holds, the location of a and b in this sequence.  
This will give an indication of the point at which the indifference curve through a 
intersects with the straight horizontal line from c to f, as in Figure 3, which, assuming 
symmetry, depicts two mutually exclusive cases where the indifference curve through 
point a falls between points e and f, and between points d and e.  Note that, while the 
same can be done to identify the indifference curve through point b, given the location 
of point g, the indifference curve through this point is not expected to intersect with 
the straight horizontal line from c to f.  The ordering between c and g overlaps with 
concavity. 
 
In addition, the data are analysed using rank ordered logit regressions (in STATA 8), 
assuming a simple additive model between health maximisation and inequality 
reduction.  The dependent variable is the rank given to a scenario, and the explanatory 
variables are the total gain in health across the two groups (GAIN) and the size of the 
difference in final health resulting from the scenario (INEQ).   The performance of the 
model is assessed by looking at the product moment correlation between the predicted 
probabilities of a given scenario being ranked first and the average ranks of the 
scenario. 
 
2.3 Logistics 
 
Letters of invitation were sent out to 2000 people on the electoral register in two 
wards in Sheffield.  Potential respondents were invited to participate in a group 
interview for which they would be paid £15.  Brief discussion groups with groups of 5 
to 8 people were conducted before each participant was asked, on an individual basis, 
to complete the questionnaire.  Respondents were prompted by the facilitator to check 
whether they understood the questions.   
 
3. Results 
 
3.1 Respondents 
 
In total, 257 people (13.2%) agreed to take part.  To ensure that the sample was 
broadly representative of the wider population, 192 respondents were selected based 
on information on their age and sex obtained from their reply slips.  In total, 128 
(66.7%) participants attended a group interview.  Five respondents had missing or 
unusable data, and were excluded from subsequent analysis. 
 
3.2 Distribution of ranking 
 
The overall rankings for the two questions are reported in Appendix B.  Tables 1(a) 
and 1(b) present the results of the tests for concave ordering.  About one half of 
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respondents satisfy concavity on each question in relation to social class and about 
one-third do so in relation to differences between the sexes.  The modal preference is 
to satisfy the concave ordering in both questions and both variants (a total of 28 
respondents out of 123), whilst 11 respondents consistently support the reverse 
concave ordering.   
 
These rankings suggest that more respondents are averse to inequalities in outcomes 
than to inequalities in gains since a concave ordering is consistent with outcome 
egalitarianism (and trading) but not with gain egalitarianism.  However, there is 
considerable difference between the versions of the questionnaire, particularly in 
Question 3, where over one-third of respondents in the sexes variant exhibit gain 
egalitarian preferences (compared with less than one in ten in the social classes 
variant).  There is less difference between the variants in Question 4, but gain 
egalitarianism is still more common in the sexes variant. 
 
It is worth noting that some respondents may have been distribution neutral 
maximisers.  Since maximisers are indifferent between all choices on the ΔHI + ΔHJ = 
C line, in the absence of being able to give tied ranks, they would have to have chosen 
randomly.  Our experience from earlier piloting, however, suggests that very few 
respondents would fall into this group.  It is also worth noting that, in the choice 
between three programmes that generate the same overall benefit, many respondents 
rank the ‘middle’ option first (that is, prefer a programme that targets the worst off yet 
at the same time gives something to both groups). 
 
Tables 2(a) and 2(b) show the results of the tests for dominant ordering.  Across the 
two questions and the two variants, the dominant ordering is the modal preference out 
of the 24 possible combinations.  For Q3, the second most frequent ordering is c f e f 
d f f for the social class variant  (13%) and d f c f e f f for the sex variant (12%), 
which are both similar to the dominant ordering (c f d f e f f).  Support for the 
reverse dominant ordering is around 2%.  However, the second most frequent 
ordering for Q4 after the dominant ordering is the reverse dominant ordering across 
the two variants (13% and 17%).  This suggests that a significant minority support 
gain egalitarianism.  Around 32% of those in the social class variant and 26% of those 
in the sexes variant chose the dominant ordering consistently across the two 
questions.  There were no respondents who chose the reverse dominant ordering 
across the two questions. 
 
3.3 Location of the indifference curve through points a and b 
 
Tables 3 and 4 summarise the distribution of respondents in terms of the ranking 
given to scenario a (and then b), relative to the horizontal straight line between c and 
f, provided that dominant ordering is satisfied.  The results for Question 3 in Table 
3(a) indicate that there is moderate aversion to inequalities in life expectancy across 
the social classes but there is no aversion to inequalities across the sexes, where men 
are worse off than women.  In fact, a[2,2] f c[4,0] holds for the median respondent 
here, which supports gain egalitarianism.  At the same time, f[2,0] f a[2,2] holds for 
16% of respondents in the social class variant and 25% in the sexes variant, implying 
backward bending social welfare contours i.e. contours that are strictly in favour of 
reducing the inequality between two groups even if both groups are worse off as 
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result.  Table 3(b), looking at the indifference curve through point b[3,1], indicates 
that the corresponding proportions are 8% and 28%, respectively.  Overall, 16% in the 
social class variant and 18% in the sexes variant have indifference curves through 
points a and b that intersect. 
 
The results for Question 4 indicate that, in the context of inequality in long-term 
illness, people are equally averse to inequalities between the social classes and the 
sexes, where women are worse off than men.  Taken together, the modal preference is 
to have the indifference curve through a located between e[-10,-2] and f[-7,-2].  On 
the other hand, the results in relation to point g suggest that 21% of the social class 
variant and 25% of the sexes variant have the ordering c[-12,-2] f g[-14,-0], implying 
gain egalitarianism.  However, none of these respondents also have a[-7,-7] f c[-12,-
2] i.e. they have intersecting indifference curves. 
 
3.5 Aggregate results 
 
Table 5 reports the regression results.  Since the units of health gain in the two 
questions are not the same, it is inappropriate to compare the regression coefficients 
across the questions.  Moreover, since both GAIN and INEQ are crude proxy 
measures for total gains and outcome inequalities, it is also inappropriate to compare 
the relative size of the regression coefficient for GAIN with the coefficient for INEQ 
within one regression.  However, it is meaningful to compare the relative size of the 
GAIN coefficients (or the INEQ coefficients) across the social class variant and the 
sex variant, within a given question.  All regression coefficients are significant (p < 
0.05), and have the expected sign: the preferences are for increased total health, and 
decreased outcome inequality.  Both these preferences are stronger in the context of 
social class than in the case of sex, both in the life expectancy question and the long-
term illness question.  The final row indicates that the correlation between the 
predicted probability of a given scenario to be ranked first and the average rank given 
to the scenario.  Since more preferred scenarios have higher probabilities and lower 
ranks, full agreement will have a correlation coefficient of -1.  As can be seen, the 
four regressions perform well. 
 
4. Discussion 
 
This study explores peoples’ preferences in relation to the distribution of health 
benefits and final health.  It uses a ranking exercise to explore the nature and extent of 
inequality aversion.  There are two conjectures: one is that when an existing 
inequality is perceived to be less inequitable, more people will support gain 
egalitarianism; and the second is that when an existing inequality is perceived to be 
more inequitable, more people will violate the monotonicity principle.  The results 
suggest that most respondents are inequality averse, but the kind of inequality 
aversion varies across question and variant.  With differences in life expectancy by 
social class, respondents appear to focus heavily on the final distribution of health, in 
line with outcome egalitarianism.  However, with differences in life expectancy by 
sex, as well as with differences in long-term illness by social class and by sex, about 
one-third of respondents appear to be focusing on the size of the benefit to each party, 
in line with gain egalitarianism.  The latter does not accord with standard social 
welfare functions based in the outcomes space, because gain egalitarianism is based in 
the gains space.  However, both are in line with our conjectures.  In addition, in the 
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choice between three programmes that generate the same overall benefit, a sizeable 
minority of respondents prefer the programme that targets the worst off yet at the 
same time gives something to both groups.  Such results might make some intuitive 
sense but, again, they do not accord with the notion of an outcome based social 
welfare function. 
 
A dominant ordering is the modal preference across the four question variants, which 
sits easily with standard outcome-focused economic models.  However, a significant 
minority violates dominance. There is an increasing body of evidence that suggests 
that violations of standard welfare economic axioms are far from rare (see for 
example Amiel and Cowell, 1999).  We suggest that there is the need for more 
empirical research, across a range of decision contexts, to understand why so many 
people have non-standard preferences, including the violation of dominance as 
defined in this paper. 
 
The regression results show that, both health maximisation and inequality aversion are 
stronger for inequalities across social classes than across the sexes, and this applies to 
both inequalities in life expectancy and in long-term illness.  This is consistent with 
the finding that gain-based egalitarianism found more support in the sexes variant 
than in the social class variant.  Regarding inequality aversion in outcomes, there are 
many respondents, particularly to the social class questions, whose rankings would 
imply backward bending social welfare functions.  In other words, the final 
distribution of health could mean less health for both groups, so long as the inequality 
narrows.  Again, such responses generate pathological social welfare functions in 
standard economics terms, but to us, and as we have argued elsewhere (Abasolo and 
Tsuchiya, 2004), are entirely plausible, particularly if health is seen as a pre-requisite 
for us to flourish as individuals (Anand, 2002, Culyer, 1971, Culyer, 1989). 
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Table 1(a): The support for concave ordering in Q1 on life expectancy (%) 
 
 
Preference social class sexes total 
Outcome based aversion 
c[4,0] f b[3,1] f a[2,2]  44 33 38 
Gain based aversion 
a[2,2] f b[3,1] f c[4,0]  9 35 24 
‘Middle’ preferred 
b[3,1] f c[4,0], b[3,1] f a[2,2]  17 13 15 
All others 30 18. 24 
 
mode in bold 
sum to 100% along the columns 
 
 
 
 
Table 1(b): The support for concave ordering in Q2 on long-term illness (%) 
 
 
Preference social class sexes total 
Outcome-based aversion 
g[14,0] f c[12,2] f a[7,7]  52 39 45 
Gain-based aversion 
a[7,7] f c[12,2] f g[14,0]  24 32 29 
‘Middle’ preferred 
c[12,2] f a[7,7], c[12,2] f g[14,0]  17 17 17 
All others  7 12 10 
 
mode in bold 
sum to 100% along the columns 
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Table 2(a): The support for dominant ordering in Q1 on life expectancy (%) 
 
 
Preference social class sexes total 
Dominant 
c[4,0] f d[3.5,0] f e[3,0] f f[2,0] 57 57 57 
Gain based 
f[2,0] f e[3,0] f d[3.5,0] f c[4,0] 2 3 2 
All others 41 41 41 
 
mode in bold 
sum to 100% along the columns 
 
 
 
 
Table 2(b): The support for dominant ordering in Q2 on long-term illness (%) 
 
 
Preference social class sexes total 
Dominant 
c[12,2] f d[11,2] f e[10,2] f f[7,2] 43 35 38 
Gain based 
f[7,2] f e[10,2] f d[11,2] f c[12,2] 13 17 15 
All others 44 48 46 
 
mode in bold 
sum to 100% along the columns 
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Table 3(a): Distribution (%) of the location of indifference curve through a in 
Question 3 on life expectancy – respondents with dominant ordering only 
 
 
 social class sexes Total 
to the right of c [4,0] 32 50 43 
between c [4,0] and d [3.5,0] 16 8 12 
between d [3.5,0] and e [3,0] 8 6 7 
between e [3,0] and f [2,0] 28 11 18 
to the left of f [2,0]* 16 25 21 
total (n) 25 36 61 
 
Median in bold 
* This implies a backward bending iso-welfare contour. 
 
 
 
Table 3(b): Distribution (%) of the location of indifference curve through b in 
Question 1 on life expectancy – respondents with dominant ordering only 
 
 social class sexes Total 
to the right of c [4,0] 20 39 31 
between c [4,0] and d [3.5,0] 20 8 13 
between d [3.5,0] and e [3,0] 52 25 36 
to the left of e [3,0] * 8 28 19 
total (n) 25 36 61 
 
Median in bold 
* This implies a backward bending iso-welfare contour. 
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Table 4(a): Distribution (%) of the location of indifference curve through a in 
Question 2 on long term illness – respondents with dominant ordering only 
 
 
 social class sexes Total 
to the right of c [12,2] 9 17 13 
between c [12,2] and d [11,2] 0 17 9 
between d [11,2] and e [10,2] 4 8 6 
between e [10,2] and f [7,2] 61 29 45 
to the left of f [7,2] * 26 29 28 
total (n) 23 24 47 
 
Median in bold 
* This implies a backward bending iso-welfare contour. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4(b): Distribution (%) of the location of indifference curve through g in 
Question 2 on long term illness – respondents with dominant ordering only 
 
 social class sexes Total 
to the right of c [12,2] 78 75 77 
to the left of c [12,2]  ‡  21 25 23 
total (n) 23 24 47 
 
Median in bold. 
‡ This implies gain egalitarianism. 
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 Table 5: The additive model using rank ordered logit regression 
 
Q3: life expectancy Q4: long term illness 
 
social class sexes social class sexes 
GAIN 0.88 0.74 0.14 0.08 
INEQ -0.31 -0.20 -0.09 -0.03 
Correlation -0.93 -0.90 -0.97 -0.84 
 
Bold where p < 0.05 
GAIN: total gain in health across the two groups 
INEQ: the size of the difference in final health resulting from the scenario 
Correlation: Pearson product moment correlation between the predicted probability of 
a given scenario being first best, and the average rank of the scenario.  The closer this 
is to -1 the better is the performance of the regression. 
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Figure 1: The Outcomes space and the Gains space 
 
 
 
 
 HJ     ΔHJ 
 ΔHI = ΔHJ HI = HJ 
  p 
    S   ΔHI 
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Figure 2(a): The starting point and the six scenario outcomes in Q3 
 
 
 
The move from the starting point S to a corresponds to the equal gain line ΔHI = ΔHJ.   
Points a, b, and c lie on the constant total gain line ΔHI + ΔHJ = C. 
Points c, d, e, f, and S lie on a horizontal line with HJ held constant. 
 
HJ ΔHI = ΔHJ 
HI = HJ 
 a 
 b 
  S  f   e d c 
ΔHI + ΔHJ = C 
0 HI 
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Figure 2(b): The starting point and the six scenario outcomes in Q4 
 
 
 
The move from the starting point S to a corresponds to the equal gain line ΔHI = ΔHJ.   
Points a, c, and g lie on the constant total gain line ΔHI + ΔHJ = C. 
Points c, d, e, and f lie on a horizontal line with HJ held constant. 
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Figure 3: Two alternative indifference curves through a 
 
 
Labels for the points are dropped (see Figure 1 above). 
The figure shows two symmetric contours through point a that intersect with the 
horizontal line c-d-e-f at different points. 
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Appendix A: Format for life expectancy question 
 
Whilst actual life expectancy varies between individuals, on average, people 
in social class 1 live to be 78 and in social class 5 they live to be 73.  Imagine 
that you are asked to choose between six programmes that will increase 
average life expectancy.  
 
 
Social class 1 
 
Social class 5 
78 +0 years 
= 78 years 
 
 73 +2 years 
= 75 years 
 
Social class 1 
 
Social class 5 
78 +0 years 
=78 years 
 
73+3 years 
=76 years 
 
Social class 1 
 
Social class 5 
78 +1 years 
=79 years 
 
73+3 years 
=76 years 
 
Social class 1 
 
Social class 5 
78 +2 years 
=80 years 
 
73+2 years 
=75 years 
 
Social class 1 
 
Social class 5 
78 +0 years 
=78 years 
 
73+3.5 years 
= 76.5 years 
 
Social class 1 
 
Social class 5 
78 +0 years 
=78 years 
 
73+4 years 
=77 years 
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Appendix B1: Ranks given to different scenarios in Q1 on life expectancy (%) 
 
 
scenario variant 1 2 3 4 5 6 average rank 
social class 24 19 6 11 20 20 3.46 
a 
[2,2] 
sexes 44 10 7 3 7 29 3.07 
social class 11 15 43 20 9 2 3.07 
b 
[3,1] 
sexes 9 39 19 19 12 3 2.94 
social class 54 20 11 0 9 6 2.07 
c 
[4,0] 
sexes 38 13 26 10 9 4 2.52 
social class 6 32 19 26 11 7 3.28 
d 
[3.5,0] 
sexes 6 28 20 32 9 6 3.28 
social class 2 15 17 30 30 7 3.93 e 
[3,0] 
sexes 1 4 20 26 39 9 4.23 
social class 4 0 6 13 20 57 5.19 f 
[2,0] sexes 3 6 7 10 25 49 4.96 
 
mode in bold 
sum to 100% along the rows 
social class variant: n = 54 
sexes variant: n = 67 
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Appendix B2: Ranks given to different scenarios in Q2 on long term illness (%) 
 
 
scenario variant 1 2 3 4 5 6 average rank 
social class 19 7 7 4 35 29 4.13 
a 
[7,7] 
sexes 38 4 7 6 16 29 3.45 
social class 50 4 15 6 11 15 2.69 
g 
[14,0] 
Sexes 38 6 15 6 9 28 3.25 
social class 11 48 11 6 19 6 2.89 
c 
[12,2] 
Sexes 9 42 9 13 22 6 3.14 
social class 2 11 50 20 11 6 3.44 
d 
[11,2] 
Sexes 1 9 36 40 10 3 3.58 
social class 4 19 11 52 11 4 3.59 e 
[10,2] 
Sexes 3 20 30 28 15 4 3.43 
social class 15 11 6 13 13 43 4.26 f 
[7,2] Sexes 12 19 3 7 29 30 4.14 
 
mode in bold. 
sum to 100% along the rows 
social class variant: n = 54 
sexes variant: n = 67 
 
 
 
